Andrew del Rio
Research
I specialize in epistemology and ethics. My research focuses on the nature and rational profile of doxastic attitudes, especially the agnostic attitude--suspension. I'm interested in how accounts of suspension relate to debates in epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion.
Published Work
"Suspending belief in credal accounts" in Noûs (2022)
Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of suspension, I argue that all possible credal accounts face serious challenges. They either (i) falsify central claims that uphold the credal picture itself or (ii) do not permit suspension in cases where it is permissible or (iii) rule out the possibility of plainly possible confidence comparisons.
"Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1" in Analysis (2022)
On one view of the traditional doxastic attitudes, belief is credence 1, disbelief is credence 0, and suspension is any precise credence between 0 and 1. Jane Friedman (2013) argues, against these views, that there are cases where a credence of 0 is required but where suspension is permitted. If this were so, belief, disbelief, and suspension could not be identified or reduced to the aforementioned credences. I argue that Friedman relies on two different notions of epistemic rationality and two different kinds of evidential absence. I clarify these distinctions and show that her argument is either not valid or includes implausible premisses, twice over. If this is so, the view that belief is credence 1, disbelief is credence 0, and suspension is any precise credence between 0 and 1 cannot be rejected on the grounds that Friedman proposes.
"Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough" in Synthese (2021)
Denying the conclusion of a valid argument is not generally permissible if one suspends on one premise of the argument and believes the other premise(s). This can happen when one’s only critique of an argument is to undermine one premise. There is incoherence there. Here I examine how this is relevant to the debate on evolutionary debunking of our moral knowledge. I argue that one significant line of response to the debunker is unsuccessful: merely undermining the debunker’s empirical claim. It is not rational to respond this way and believe one has moral knowledge. First I present evidence that prominent critics of the debunking argument merely undermine the debunker’s empirical claim. Then I argue for two premises: (1) merely undermining a premise can only justify a middling amount of doubt towards the premise and (2) we should have no more doubt about the conclusion of a valid argument than we do about the premises. Implications of the argument are explored.
Traditionally epistemologists have taken doxastic states to come in three varieties—belief, disbelief, and suspension. Recently many epistemologists have taken our doxastic condition to be usefully represented by credences—quantified degrees of belief. Moreover, some have thought that this new credal picture is sufficient to account for everything we want to explain with the old traditional picture. Therefore, belief, disbelief, and suspension must map onto the new picture somehow. In this paper I challenge that possibility. Approaching the question from the angle of suspension, I argue that all possible credal accounts face serious challenges. They either (i) falsify central claims that uphold the credal picture itself or (ii) do not permit suspension in cases where it is permissible or (iii) rule out the possibility of plainly possible confidence comparisons.
"Absence of evidence against belief as credence 1" in Analysis (2022)
On one view of the traditional doxastic attitudes, belief is credence 1, disbelief is credence 0, and suspension is any precise credence between 0 and 1. Jane Friedman (2013) argues, against these views, that there are cases where a credence of 0 is required but where suspension is permitted. If this were so, belief, disbelief, and suspension could not be identified or reduced to the aforementioned credences. I argue that Friedman relies on two different notions of epistemic rationality and two different kinds of evidential absence. I clarify these distinctions and show that her argument is either not valid or includes implausible premisses, twice over. If this is so, the view that belief is credence 1, disbelief is credence 0, and suspension is any precise credence between 0 and 1 cannot be rejected on the grounds that Friedman proposes.
"Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough" in Synthese (2021)
Denying the conclusion of a valid argument is not generally permissible if one suspends on one premise of the argument and believes the other premise(s). This can happen when one’s only critique of an argument is to undermine one premise. There is incoherence there. Here I examine how this is relevant to the debate on evolutionary debunking of our moral knowledge. I argue that one significant line of response to the debunker is unsuccessful: merely undermining the debunker’s empirical claim. It is not rational to respond this way and believe one has moral knowledge. First I present evidence that prominent critics of the debunking argument merely undermine the debunker’s empirical claim. Then I argue for two premises: (1) merely undermining a premise can only justify a middling amount of doubt towards the premise and (2) we should have no more doubt about the conclusion of a valid argument than we do about the premises. Implications of the argument are explored.
Works in Progress
- A paper on a new account of the agnostic attitude
- A paper on the features and failures of a higher-order belief account of suspension
- A paper on the fundamental nature of traditional doxastic attitudes
- A paper on new challenges to (anti-)interrogative accounts of suspension
- A paper on suspension, vagueness, and the inadequacy of credences
- A paper on the relationship between doubt and suspension
- A paper on the rational conditions for and consequences of suspending
- A paper on irrelevant influences, suspension, and having no reason to believe
- A paper on atheism, deism, and agnosticism
- A paper on moral agnosticism and moral error theory
- A paper on moral testimony and knowledge by acquaintance
- A paper on the coherence of Kant’s moral theory and ancient eudaimonism
Research Statement
Copyright © 2021